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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 05-1914

MAGDI FARAG,
Appellant

v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

On Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A95-517-104
Initially Docketed as an Appeal from EDPA No. 04-cv-04710
Prior to the Enactment of the Real ID Act of 2005

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 27, 2006
Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES, and BECKER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed March 28, 2006 )

OPINION

BECKER, Circuit Judge.

This is a Petition for Review by Magdi Ali Farag, an Egyptian national, of an order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) finding that Farag was not entitled to deferral
of removal because he had failed to meet his burden of establishing that it was more likely
than not that he would be tortured upon his return to Egypt. Although the action began in
Federal District Court as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the passage of the REAL ID
Act converts this appeal into a petition for review. Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 442,
446 (3d Cir. 2005).
Farag, who attended the University of Cairo and studied law, asserts that he was
persecuted and tortured prior to his departure from Egypt in 1984. He states that on one
occasion, President Sadat went on TV to say that if there were any more strikes against his
government, those responsible for organizing and participating in the strikes would be
arrested and put in jail; that he, and other classmates and friends, were detained by the
government on several occasions due to its belief that they were engaged in suspicious
activities when he was a student at Cairo University; and that he and the others whom he
came to know as also having been detained by the Egyptian government were abused,
physically, emotionally and verbally, while in official custody. Farag further asserts that the
government of President Mubarak was corrupt when he lived there and still is. He contends
that the security forces are still brutal and that the problems in Egypt that existed before he
fled the country, such as the inability to speak freely and vote freely, continue.
For the reasons that follow, we deny the Petition for Review. Because the parties are
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fully familiar with the background facts and procedural history we need not set them forth,
and limit our discussion to our ratio decidendi.
The BIA applied the correct standard of review and afforded Farag due process. He
was afforded the opportunity to develop a full evidentiary record so as to elucidate his
assertions that he will be tortured upon his return to Egypt based upon the Sadat
government’s arresting him twice in Cairo in 1979 for student protests; his membership in
a group called the Muslim Brothers from 1980 to 1984; his assertion that he will be regarded
as a “suspicious” person by the current government; and that he will be tortured by
authorities and/or the Muslim Brothers.
Our standard of review is extremely deferential. We must uphold the IJ’s findings if
they are “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record
considered as a whole,” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1991) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1105a(a)(4)), and may not reject them “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
Based upon this rigorous standard, we are constrained to find that substantial evidence
supports the BIA’s conclusion that there was no evidence that Farag’s former Muslim
Brothers affiliation was likely to result in torture by government authorities, because Farag
was not harmed by Egyptian authorities while he was a member of the organization, and
Farag left the organization twenty years ago. Indeed, Farag lived unmolested in Egypt for
four years after his arrests for the student activities that occurred during the 1979-80 time
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period. Other than those remote events, he offered no other evidence of the likelihood of
future persecution. Likewise, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that
criminal deportees are not subject to detention upon their removal to Egypt.
Our conclusion is supported by Hassanein v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 324 (8th Cir. 2004),
in which the BIA was affirmed on similar facts. The failure of Farag’s asylum claims also
dooms his claim under the Convention Against Torture. See 8 CFR 208.17 (2002).
The Petition for Review will be denied.
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